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the architectures are, indeed, satisfied in the resulting software model.
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1 Introduction
Satellites and other complex systems become increasingly software-dependent. Even nanosatellites
have complexity that can be compared to scientific instruments launched to Mars. Standards
exist for hardware parts and designs, and they can be found as commercial off the shelf (COTS)
components. On the contrary, software has to be adapted to the payload and, consequently,
hardware architecture selected for the satellite. There is not a rigorous and robust way to design
software for CubeSats1 or small satellites yet.
Flight software safety is of paramount importance for satellites. In harsh radiation environ-
ments, performance of COTS components is often affected by proton particles. For example,
the I2C bus, which is commonly used in CubeSats due to its low energy consumption and wide
availability in COTS chips, is well known in space community for its glitches. Although error
correcting algorithms are widely implemented across all subsystems and interfaces, the use of the
bus by the components requires careful coordination to ensure correct operation. Needless to say,
software correctness must be established before launch.
To the best of our knowledge, most flight software for university satellites is written in C or
C++, without any architectural thinking. A notable exception is a recent effort at Vermont Tech
to use SPARK, a variant of Ada amenable to static analysis [14]. Other projects simply structure
their code in C/C++ and then extensively test it, maybe using some analysis tools such as lint
[27]. Others use SysML [34] to describe the system as a whole [33] and then check some properties
such as energy consumption. SysML can be a valid tool for system engineering as a whole, but it
is not rigorous enough to allow automatic verification and validation of software behaviour.
Satellite on-board software and, more generally, all modern software systems are inherently con-
current. They consist of components that—at least on the conceptual level—run simultaneously
and share access to resources provided by the execution platform. Embedded control software in
various domains commonly comprises, in addition to components responsible for taking the con-
trol decisions, a set of components driving the operation of sensing and actuation devices. These
components interact through buses, shared memories and message buffers, leading to resource
contention and potential deadlocks compromising mission- and safety-critical operations.
The intrinsic concurrent nature of such interactions is the root cause of the sheer complexity of
the resulting software. Indeed, in order to analyse the behaviour of such a software system, one has
to consider all possible interleavings of the operations executed by its components. Thus, the com-
plexity of software systems is exponential in the number of their components, making a posteriori
verification of their correctness practically infeasible. An alternative approach consists in ensuring
correctness by construction, through the application of well-defined design principles [4, 20], impos-
ing behavioural contracts on individual components [8] or by applying automatic transformations
to obtain executable code from formally defined high-level models [32].
Following this latter approach, a notion of architectures was proposed in [2] to formalise design
patterns for the coordination of concurrent components. Architectures provide means for ensuring
correctness by construction by enforcing global properties characterising the coordination between
components. An architecture can be defined as an operator A that, applied to a set of compo-
nents B, builds a composite component A(B) meeting a characteristic property Φ. Composability
is based on an associative, commutative and idempotent architecture composition operator ⊕:
architecture composition preserves the safety properties enforced by the individual architectures.
Architecture styles [23, 25] are families of architectures sharing common characteristics such as the
type of the involved components and the characteristic properties they enforce. Architecture styles
define all architectures for an arbitrary set of components that satisfy some minimal assumptions
on their interfaces.
1CubeSat [15] is a standard for the design of nano- and picosatellites.
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Figure 1: Mutual exclusion model in BIP
The notion of architectures proposed in [2] is based on the Behaviour-Interaction-Priority
(BIP) [6] framework for the component-based design of concurrent software and systems. BIP
is supported by a tool-set comprising translators from various programming models into BIP,
source-to-source transformers as well as compilers for generating code executable by dedicated
engines. Furthermore, the BIP tool-set provides tools for deadlock detection [7], state reachability
analysis and an interface with the nuXmv model checker [10]. In the CubETH project [31], BIP
was used to design logic for the operation of a satellite, executed on the on-board computer [29].
Although some properties were shown a posteriori to hold by construction, due to the use of a
high-level modelling language instead of plain C/C++ code, the BIP model was designed in an
ad-hoc manner, without consideration for any particular set of requirements.
In the case study presented in this technical report, we have analysed the BIP model obtained in
[29] and identified a number of recurring patterns, which we formalised as architecture styles. We
have identified a representative sub-system of the CubETH control software, which has a complete
set of functional requirements, and redesigned from scratch the corresponding BIP model using the
architecture styles to discharge these requirements by construction. We have used the DFinder tool
to verify that the resulting model is free from deadlocks. Finally, we provide additional validation
of our approach by using the nuXmv model checker to verify that the architectures applied in the
design process do, indeed, enforce the required properties.
The rest of the technical report is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of
BIP and the architecture-based design approach. Section 3 presents the case study, the 9 identified
architecture styles, illustrates our approach through the design of a corresponding BIP model and
presents the complete list of functional requirements and CTL properties, the verification process
and results. Section 4 discusses the related work. Section 5 concludes the report.
2 Architecture-based design approach
Our approach relies on the BIP framework [6] for component-based design of correct-by-construction
applications. BIP provides a simple, but powerful mechanism for the coordination of concurrent
components by superposing three layers. First, component behaviour is described by Labelled
Transition Systems (LTS) having transitions labelled with ports. Ports form the interface of a
component and are used to define its interactions with other components. Second, interaction
models, i.e. sets of interactions, define the component coordination. Interactions are sets of ports
that define allowed synchronisations between components. An interaction model is defined in
a structured manner by using connectors [9]. Third, priorities are used to impose scheduling
constraints and to resolve conflicts when multiple interactions are enabled simultaneously.
Figure 1 shows a simple BIP model for mutual exclusion between two tasks. It has two
components B1, B2 modelling the tasks and one coordinator component C12. Initial states of
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the components are shown with double lines. The four binary connectors synchronise each of the
actions b1, b2 (resp. f1, f2) of the tasks with the action b12 (resp. f12) of the coordinator.
Connectors define sets of interactions based on the synchronisation attributes of the connected
ports, which may be either trigger or synchron (Fig. 2a). If all connected ports are synchrons,
then synchronisation is by rendezvous, i.e. the defined interaction may be executed only if all the
connected components allow the transitions of those ports (Fig. 2b), If a connector has at least one
trigger, the synchronisation is by broadcast, i.e. the allowed interactions are all non-empty subsets
of the connected ports comprising at least one of the trigger ports (Fig. 2b). More complex
connectors can be built hierarchically (Fig. 2c).
An architecture can be viewed as a BIP model, where some of the atomic components are
considered as coordinators, while the rest are parameters. When an architecture is applied to
a set of components, these components are used as operands to replace the parameters of the
architecture. Clearly, operand components must refine the corresponding parameter ones—in
that sense, parameter components can be considered as types.2 Figure 3 shows an architecture
that enforces the mutual exclusion property AG¬(cs1∧cs2) on any two components with interfaces
{b1, f1} and {b2, f2}, satisfying the CTL formula AG
(
fi → A[¬csi W bi]
)
, where csi is an atomic
predicate, true when the component is in the critical section (e.g. in the state work, for B1, B2
of Fig. 1). Composition of architectures is based on an associative, commutative and idempotent
architecture composition operator ‘⊕’ [2]. If two architectures A1 and A2 enforce respectively
safety properties Φ1 and Φ2, the composed architecture A1 ⊕ A2 enforces the property Φ1 ∧ Φ2,
that is both properties are preserved by architecture composition.
Although the architecture in Fig. 3 can only be applied to a set of precisely two components, it
2The precise definition of the refinement relation is beyond the scope of this technical report.
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Figure 4: Architecture-based design flow
is clear that an architecture of the same style—with n parameter components and 2n connectors—
could be applied to any set of operand components satisfying the above CTL formula. We use
architecture diagrams [25] to specify such architecture styles, as described in the next section. (See
Fig. 6 in Sect. 3.1.1 for the diagram of the style generalising the architecture in Fig. 3.)
The architecture-based design approach consists of the three stages illustrated in Fig. 4. First,
architecture styles relevant for the application domain—in our case, nano- and picosatellite on-
board software—are identified and formally modelled. Ideally, this stage is only realised once for
each application domain. The remaining stages are applied for each system to be designed. In
the second, design stage, requirements to be satisfied by the system are analysed and formalised,
atomic components realising the basic functionality of the system are designed (components pre-
viously designed for other systems can be reused) and used as operands for the application of
architectures instantiated from the styles defined in the first stage. The choice of the architectures
to apply is driven by the requirements identified in the second stage. Finally, the resulting sys-
tem is checked for deadlock-freedom. Properties, which are not enforced by construction through
architecture application, must be verified a posteriori. In this case study, we illustrate all steps of
this process, except the requirement formalisation.
In the first stage, we use architecture diagrams [25] to model the architecture styles identified
in the case study. An architecture diagram consists of a set of component types, with associated
cardinality constraints representing the expected number of instances of each component type and
a set of connector motifs. Connector motifs, which define sets of BIP connectors, are non-empty
sets of port types, each labelled as either a trigger or a synchron. Each port type has a cardinality
constraint representing the expected number of port instances per component instance and two
additional constraints: multiplicity and degree, represented as a pair m : d. Multiplicity constrains
the number of instances of the port type that must participate in a connector defined by the motif;
degree constrains the number of connectors attached to any instance of the port type.
Cardinalities, multiplicities and degrees are either natural numbers or intervals. The interval
attributes, ‘mc’ (multiple choice) or ‘sc’ (single choice), specify whether these constraints are
uniformly applied or not. Let us consider, a port type p with associated intervals defining its
multiplicity and degree. We write ‘sc[x, y]’ to mean that the same multiplicity or degree is applied
to each port instance of p. We write ‘mc[x, y]’ to mean that different multiplicities or degrees can
be applied to different port instances of p, provided they lie in the interval.
For the specification of behavioural properties enforced by architecture styles, as well as those
assumed for the parameter components, we use the Computation Tree Logic (CTL). We only
provide a brief overview, referring the reader to the classical textbook [3] for a complete and
formal presentation. CTL formulas specify properties of execution trees generated by LTSs. The
formulas are built from atomic predicates on the states of the LTS, using the several operators,
such as EX, AX, EF, AF, EG, AG (unary) and E[· U ·], A[· U ·], E[· W ·], A[· W ·] (binary). Each operator
consists of a quantifier on the branches of the tree and a temporal modality, which together define
when in the execution the operand sub-formulas must hold. The intuition behind the letters is the
following: the branch quantifiers are A (for “All”) and E (for “Exists”); the temporal modalities
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Figure 5: The high-level interaction model
are X (for “neXt”), F (for “some time in the Future”), G (for “Globally”), U (for “Until”) and W
(for “Weak until”). A property is satisfied if it holds in the initial state of the LTS. For instance,
the formula A[p W q] specifies that in all execution branches the predicate p must hold up to the
first state (not including this latter), where the predicate q holds. Since we used the weak until
operator W, if q never holds, p must hold forever. As soon as q holds in one state of an execution
branch, p need not hold any more, even if q does not hold. On the contrary, the formula AG A[p W q]
specifies that the subformula A[p W q] must hold in all branches at all times. Thus, p must hold
whenever q does not hold, i.e. AG A[p W q] = AG (p ∨ q).
3 Case study
CubETH is a nanosatellite based on the CubeSat standard [15]. It contains the following sub-
systems: EPS (electrical power subsystem), CDMS (command and data management subsystem),
COM (telecommunication subsystem), ADCS (attitude determination and control subsystem), PL
(payload) and the mechanical structure including the antenna deployment subsystem.
This case study is focused on the software running on the CDMS subsystem and in particular on
the following subcomponents of CDMS: 1) CDMS status that is in charge of resetting internal and
external watchdogs; 2) Payload that is in charge of payload operations; 3) three Housekeeping
components that are used to recover engineering data from the EPS, PL and COM subsystems; 4)
CDMS Housekeeping which is internal to the CDMS; 5) I2C sat that implements the I2C protocol; 6)
Flash memory management that implements a non-volatile flash memory and its write-read proto-
col; 7) the s3 5, s3 6, s15 1 and s15 2 services that are in charge of the activation or deactivation
of the housekeeping component actions; 8) Error Logging that implements a RAM region that
is accessible by many users and 9) the MESSAGE LIBRARY, MEMORY LIBRARY and I2C sat LIBRARY
components that contain auxiliary C/C++ functions.
A high-level BIP model of the case-study is shown in Fig. 5. For the sake of simplicity, we omit
some of the connectors. In particular, we show the connectors involving the HK to MEM, HK to I2C
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Figure 6: Architecture diagram of the Mutual exclusion style
and HK to I2C NOFAIL interfaces of the HK COM subsystem, but we omit the respective connectors
involving the other three Housekeeping subsystems. The MESSAGE LIBRARY, MEMORY LIBRARY,
I2C sat LIBRARY, s3 5, s3 6, s15 1 and s15 2 components are atomic. The rest are composite
components, i.e. compounds.
The full BIP model of the case study comprises 22 operand components and 27 architectures
that were generated from the architecture styles presented in the next subsection.
3.1 A taxonomy of architecture styles for on-board software
Since the identified architecture styles represent recurring patterns of satellite on-board software,
the usage of the presented taxonomy is not limited to this case study. The identified styles can
also be used for the design and development of other satellite on-board systems.
For each architecture style, we have studied two groups of properties: 1) assumed properties
that the operand components must satisfy so that the architecture can be successfully applied on
them and 2) characteristic properties that are properties the architecture imposes on the system.
In the CubETH case study all characteristic properties are safety properties.
We use simple and interval architecture diagrams to describe the 9 architecture styles. For the
sake of simplicity of the presentation, in the next subsections, we omit the cardinality of a port
type if it is equal to 1. The cardinality of a component type is indicated right next to its name.
3.1.1 Mutual exclusion style
The Mutual exclusion architecture style enforces mutual exclusion on a shared resource. The
unique—due to the cardinality being 1—coordinator component, Mutex manager, manages the
shared resource, while n parameter components of type B can access it. The multiplicities of all
port types are 1 and therefore, all connectors are binary. The degree constraints require that each
port instance of a component of type B be attached to a single connector and each port instance of
the coordinator be attached to n connectors. The behaviours of the two component types enforce
that once the resource is acquired by a component of type B, it can only be released by the same
component.
• Assumed property of operands: ‘a component exits its critical section after finish and
cannot enter it again until begin ’
∀ i 6 n, AG(finish[i]→ A[¬cs[i] W begin[i]]),
where cs[i] is an atomic predicate that evaluates to true when the B[i] component is in the
critical section (e.g. in state work for the behaviour shown in Figure 6).
• Characteristic property of architecture: ‘no two components are in their critical sec-
tion simultaneously ’
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Figure 7: Architecture diagram of the Client-Server style
AG¬(∨i6=j∈[1,n] cs[i] ∧ cs[j])
3.1.2 Client-server style
The Client-server architecture style ensures that only one client can use a service offered by the
server at each time. It consists of two parameter component types Server and Client with 1 and
n instances, respectively. In the diagram of Fig. 7, the server provides two services through port
types offer, offer2. Client has two corresponding port types use, use2. Since the cardinalities
of offer and offer2 are k and k′, respectively, each component instance of type Server has k
port instances of type offer and k′ port instances of type offer2. Similarly, each component
instance of type Client has m port instances of type use and m′ port instances of type use2.
Two connector motifs connect use (resp. use2) with offer (resp. offer2). The multiplic-
ity/degree constraint of offer is 1 : nm. The multiplicity/degree constraint of use is 1 : k. Since
both multiplicities are 1, all connectors are again binary. Because of the degree constraints, each
port instance of use must be attached to k connectors, while each port instance of offer must
be attached to nm connectors, i.e. all port instances of use are connected to all port instances of
offer.
• Assumed property of operands: ‘the services are provided synchronously, i.e. as atomic
actions’. This is not a temporal property. The duration that a client uses a service is
abstracted to be equal to 0.
• Characteristic property of architecture: ‘only one client can use a provided service at
each time’
∀ i, j 6 n, ∀ p 6 k, AG(¬Client [i].use[p] ∧ Client [j].use[p]) ,
∀ i, j 6 n, ∀ p 6 k, AG(¬Client [i].use2 [p] ∧ Client [j].use2 [p]) .
3.1.3 Action flow style
The Action flow style enforces a sequence of actions. It has one coordinator component of type
Action Flow Manager and n parameter components of type B. Each component type has four
port types: start, actBegin, actEnd, finish. The cyclic behaviour of the coordinator enforces
an order on the actions of the operands. In the behaviour of the manager, abi and aei (instances
of actBegin and actEnd, resp.) stand for “action i begin ” and “action i end”.
Each operand component c of type B provides nca port instances of type actBegin and of type
actEnd. Notice that nca might be different for different operands of type B. The cardinalities of
port types ab and ae are both equal to N =
∑
c:B n
c
a, where the sum is over all operands of type
B. The multiplicity and degree constraints require that there be only binary connectors.
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Figure 8: Architecture diagram of the Action flow style
• Assumed property of operands: ‘each action is explicitly terminated by actEnd and no
other action can be started until then’
∀i, j 6 nca, AG
(
B [c].actBegin[i]→ AX A[B [c].executing [i] ∧ ¬B [c].executing [j] W
B [c].actEnd [i ]]
)
,
∀i 6 nca, AG
(
B [c].actEnd [i]→ AX A[¬B [c].executing [i] W B [c].actBegin[i ]])) ,
where B[c].executing[i] is an atomic predicate that evaluates to true when the B[c] compo-
nent is executing action i.
• Characteristic property of architecture is the conjunction of: a) ‘on each action flow’s
execution, every action begins only after its previous action has ended ’ b) ‘on each flow
execution, every action occurs at most once’ c) ‘the flow finishes only after the last action
has ended ’, d) ‘if an action ends, it can end only after it begins again’ formalised by the
following CTL formulas, in which the index i denotes the position of an action in the action
flow.
We consider the following mappings:
– from indices to components seqc : [1, N ]→ C, where C is a set containing all operands
that execute an action;
– from indices to actions seqa : [1, N ]→ A, where A is a set containing all actions of the
operands,
such that the action seqa(i) belongs to the component seqc(i).
∀1 < i 6 N, AG(start → AX A[¬B [seqc(i)].actBegin[seqa(i)]
W B [seqc(i)].actEnd [seqa(i− 1)]
])
,
∀1 6 i 6 N, AG(B [seqc(i)].actBegin[seqa(i)]→ AX A[¬B [seqc(i)].actBegin[seqa(i)]
W start
])
,
AG
(
start → AX A[¬finish W B [seqc(i)].actEnd [N ]
])
,
∀1 6 i 6 N, AG(B[seqc(i)].actEnd [seqa(i)]→ AX A[¬B[seqc(i)].actEnd [seqa(i)]
W B[seqc(i)].actBegin[seqa(i)]
])
.
9
Figure 9: Architecture diagram of the Action flow with abort style
3.1.4 Action flow with abort style
The Action flow with abort architecture style is very similar to the Action flow style. It enforces a
sequence of N actions. However, each operand has the ability to abort an action. If a component
aborts, the behaviour of the manager is reset back to its initial state. In this style, both component
types have an additional port type actAbort. In the coordinator behaviour, aai stands for “action
i abort”.
• Assumed property of operands: ‘each action is explicitly terminated by actEnd or
actAbort and no other action can be started until then’
∀i, j 6 nca, AG
(
B [c].actBegin[i]→ AX A[B [c].executing [i] ∧ ¬B [c].executing [j]
W B [c].actEnd [i] ∨ actAbort [i]]) ,
∀i 6 nca, AG
(
B [c].actEnd [i] ∨ actAbort [i]→ AX A[¬B [c].executing [i ] W B [c].actBegin[i ]]) ,
where B[c].executing[i] is an atomic predicate that evaluates to true when the B[c] compo-
nent is executing action i.
• Characteristic property of architecture is the conjunction of first three characteristic
properties of Action flow with the properties: e) ‘if an action is ended or aborted, it can
end or abort only after it begins again’ and f) ‘when an action is aborted, an action can be
executed only after the flow is reset ’.
We consider the following mappings:
– from indices to components seqc : [1, N ]→ C, where C is a set containing all operands
that execute an action;
– from indices to actions seqa : [1, N ]→ A, where A is a set containing all actions of the
operands,
such that the action seqa(i) belongs to the component seqc(i).
∀1 6 i 6 N, AG(B[seqc(i)].actEnd [seqa(i)] ∨B[seqc(i)].actAbort [seqa(i)]→
AX A
[¬B[seqc(i)].actAbort [seqa(i)] ∧ ¬B[seqc(i)].actEnd [seqa(i)] W B[seqc(i)].actBegin[seqa(i)]]) ,
∀1 6 i, j 6 N, AG(B[seqc(i)].actAbort [seqa(i)]→ AX A[¬B[seqc(j)].actBegin[seqa(j)] W start]) .
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Figure 10: Failure monitoring style
3.1.5 Failure monitoring style
The Failure monitoring (Fig. 10) provides monitor components that observe the state of other
components. It consists of n coordinator components of type Failure Monitor and n parameter
components of type B1. The cardinality of all port types is 1. Multiplicities and degrees require
that each B1 component instance be connected to its dedicated Failure monitor instance.
A B1 component may enter the following three states: NOMINAL, ANOMALY and CRITICAL FAILURE.
When in NOMINAL state, the component is performing correctly. If the component cannot be
reached, or if the engineering data is not correct the component enters the ANOMALY state. If a
fixed time has passed in which the component has remained in ANOMALY, the component enters
the CRITICAL FAILURE state. An architecture of this style is shown in Fig. 17.
• Assumed property of operands: is ‘B1 will not execute any actions between fail and
resume ’.
∀c 6 n, AG(B1 [c].fail → AX A[(B1 [c].pause W B1 [c].resume)] ,
where B1 [c].pause is an atomic predicate that evaluates to false when the component B1[c]
executes any action other than resume.
• Characteristic property of architecture: ‘if a failure occurs, a finish happens only after
a resume or reset ’
∀c 6 n, AG(B1 [c].fail → AX A[¬B1 [c].finish W (B1 [c].resume ∨ reset)]) .
3.1.6 Mode management style
The Mode management style restricts the set of enabled actions, i.e. the actions that can be
executed, according to a set of predefined modes. It consists of one coordinator of type Mode
Manager, n parameter components of type B1 and k parameter components of type B2. Each
B2 component triggers the transition of the Mode Manager to a specific mode. The coordinator
manages which actions of the B1 components can be executed in each mode.
The behaviour of the Mode Manager has k states, one state per mode. Mode Manager has
a port type toMode with cardinality k and k port types inMode with cardinality 1. Each port
instance of type toMode must be connected through a binary connector with the changeMode port
of a dedicated B2 component.
B1 has k port types modeBegin with cardinality mc[0, 1]. In other words, a component instance
of B1 might have any number of port instances of types modeBegin from 0 until k. B1 has also a
modeEnd port type with cardinality k. mib stands for “mode i begin” and indicates that an action
11
Figure 11: Architecture diagram of the Mode management style (component behaviour is shown
for k=3)
that is enabled in mode i has begun its execution. mie stands for “mode i end” and indicates
that an action that is enabled in mode i has finished its execution. Each inMode port instance of
the Mode Manager must be connected with the corresponding modeBegin port instances of all B2
components through an n-ary connector.
• Assumed property of operands: ‘a component of type B1 executes actions allowed in
mode i only after it enters mode i’
∀ i 6 k, AG(m[i]e→ A[¬mode[i] W m[i]b]) ,
where mode[i] is an atomic predicate that evaluates to true when a B1 component is per-
forming an action allowed in mode i.
• Characteristic property of architecture: ‘an action is only performed in a mode where
it is allowed ’
∀i 6 k, AG(B1.m[i ]b → ModeManager .inMode[i]) .
3.1.7 Buffer management style
The Buffer management style controls the access of a set of producers and consumers to a buffer.
It consists of a single coordinator component of type Buffer Manager, n parameter components
of type Producer and m parameter components of type Consumer. The Buffer Manager restricts
the behaviour of producers by allowing them to write data to the buffer only if the buffer is not
full. Similarly, the Buffer Manager restricts the behaviour of consumers by allowing them to
retrieve data from the buffer only if the buffer is not empty.The cardinalities of all port types are
1. The multiplicity and degree constraints require that each Producer component instance and
Consumer component instance be connected to the Buffer manager component instance through
binary connectors.
• Assumed property of operands: no assumptions
• Characteristic property of architecture is the conjunction of the following properties:
1)‘data can be stored to the buffer only if the buffer is not full ’; 2)‘data can be retrieved from
the buffer only if the buffer is not full ’
AG
(
BufferManager .enabled(full)→ AX A[¬BufferManager .put W BufferManager .get]) ,
AG
(
BufferManager .enabled(empty)→ AX A[¬BufferManager .get W BufferManager .put]) ,
12
Figure 12: Architecture diagram of the Buffer management style
Figure 13: Architecture diagram of the Event monitoring style
where enabled(empty) and enabled(full) are atomic predicates that evaluate to true when the
empty and full actions of the Buffer manager are enabled.
3.1.8 Event monitoring style
The Event monitoring style is a special case of the Buffer management architecture style for a
buffer of size 1 and consumer cardinality equal to 1. The Event monitoring style provides a
monitor component that tracks events of other components. For each event, the monitor generates
a report and sends it to a dedicated service component. The style consists of a single coordinator
component of type Event Monitor and n parameter components of type B. The cardinalities of all
port types are 1. The multiplicity and degree constraints require that each B component instance
be connected to the Event monitor component instance. All connectors must be binary.
• Assumed property of operands: no assumptions
• Characteristic property of architecture: ‘if an event is sent to the monitor, another
event can be sent to the monitor only after a report is generated ’
∀c, c′ 6 n, AG(B [c].sndEvent → AX A[¬B [c′].sndEvent W EventMonitor .report]) .
3.1.9 Priority management style
The Priority management style enforces a priority protocol on the set of actions of n compo-
nents. It consists of a single coordinator component of type Priority Manager and n parameter
components of type B. The Priority Manager checks first whether the action with the highest
priority can be executed. If this action is enabled, it executes it and returns to its initial state.
If this action is not enabled, it checks whether the action with the second highest priority can be
executed. If this action is enabled, it executes it and returns to its initial state. If this action
is not enabled, it checks whether the action with the third highest priority can be executed, etc.
The cardinalities of the action and noAction port types are n. The cardinalities of all other port
13
Figure 14: Architecture diagram of the Priority management style
types are 1. The multiplicity and degree constraints require that each B component instance be
connected to the Priority manager component instance through binary connectors.
• Assumed property of operands: ‘action and noaction are mutually exclusive actions’
∀c 6 n, AG(enabled(B [c].action) XOR enabled(B [c].noaction)) ,
where enabled(B [i ].action) (resp. B [i ].action) is an atomic predicate that evaluates to true
when the B [i ].action (resp. B [i ].action) action is enabled.
• Characteristic property of architecture is the conjunction of the following properties:
1)‘a component cannot execute action i+ 1 unless noaction i (previous action with higher
priority) has been fired ’; 2)‘a component cannot execute noaction i + 1 unless noaction i
(previous action with higher priority) has been fired ’; 3) ‘a new cycle can start only after
there is a success or fail ’; 4) ‘once a cycle starts, success can be executed only after an
action is executed ’; 5) ‘once an action is executed, fail cannot be executed unless there is
an init.
∀i < n, AG(PriorityManager .init → A[¬B [i + 1 ].action W B [i ].noaction]) ,
∀i < n, AG(PriorityManager .init → A[¬B [i + 1 ].noaction W B [i ].noaction]) ,
AG
(
PriorityManager .init → AX A[¬PriorityManager .init W
(PriorityManager .success ∨ PriorityManager .fail)]) ,
AG
(
PriorityManager .init → A[¬PriorityManager .success W ( n∨
i=1
B [i ].action
])
,
∀i < n, AG(B [i ].action → A[¬PriorityManager .fail W PriorityManager .init]) .
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3.2 Full list of requirements
The following table contains the complete list of functional requirements of the case-study.
ID Description
CDMS-001 The CDMS shall be connected to the following sub-systems: Pay-
load (PL), Communication (COM), Electrical Power Subsystem
(EPS) through an I2C bus.
CDMS-003 The CDMS shall supervise the correct execution of the software
functions on the other subsystems. If a sensor or subsystem indi-
cates anomalous signals the CDMS shall ask the EPS for a reset
of the malfunctioning hardware.
CDMS-004 The CDMS shall be able to save its status in order to resume
correct operations following an unexpected reset.
CDMS-006 The CDMS shall manage the data generated from the payload
and housekeeping routines in a non volatile memory.
CDMS-007 The CDMS shall periodically reset both the internal and external
watchdogs and contact the EPS subsystem with a “heartbeat”.
PL-001 The Payload shall be able to add a scenario to the payload board.
PL-002 The Payload shall be able to execute scenario telecommand.
PL-003 The Payload shall be able to abort any operation on the payload
and data transfer to transfer data from the payload to the non
volatile memory.
PL-004 The Payload shall be able to check the advancement of the payload
board internals algorithms
PL-005 The Payload shall be able to track the upload, execution and result
retrieval of a scenario and enable the corresponding actions.
PL-006 The Payload subsystem shall have the following modes: IDLE,
SCENARIO READY, STARTED and RESULT READY.
PL-007 The payload shall operate when it is not in IDLE mode.
PL-008 In SCENARIO READY mode a scenario shall be loaded on the
payload board.
PL-009 In STARTED mode, the payload data acquisition shall begin.
PL-010 The payload shall poll the payload board to check if its memory
is full. If the memory is full, the payload shall change to RE-
SULT READY mode.
PL-011 In RESULT READY mode, the data shall be transferred to the
CDMS non-volatile memory. If the data retrieval is not finished,
payload shall continue the payload data acquisition until the data
retrieval is completed.
HK-001 The CDMS shall have a Housekeeping activity dedicated to each
subsystem.
HK-003 When line-of-sight communication is possible, housekeeping infor-
mation shall be transmitted through the COM subsystem.
HK-004 When line-of-sight communication is not possible, housekeeping
information shall be written to the non-volatile flash memory.
HK-005 A Housekeeping subsystem shall have the following states: NOM-
INAL, ANOMALY, and CRITICAL FAILURE.
HK-006 In NOMINAL state, the subsystem shall perform correctly.
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HK-007 If a process failure occurs or if the engineering data are not correct
the subsystem shall enter the ANOMALY state.
HK-008 After MAX3 seconds in ANOMALY, the subsystem shall enter
the CRITICAL FAILURE state.
HK-009 In CRITICAL FAILURE state, the subsystem shall contact the
EPS and demand a restart of the malfunctioning subsystem.
HK-010 During NOMINAL operation the subsystem shall be contacted to
retrieve engineering data.
I2C-001 A single user shall send one message at a time.
I2C-002 I2C sat shall implement the I2C protocol.
Log-001 Every time a hardware error is produced, it shall be stored in a
memory region in the RAM.
Log-002 The dedicated RAM region shall be read and written atomically.
Mem-001 The Central Software System shall have a dedicated Flash Mem-
ory Manager activity for managing flash memory operations.
Mem-002 Flash memory shall be read and written atomically.
Mem-003 Flash Memory Manager shall return the SUCCESS or FAIL status
for each requested operation.
Mem-004 Upon a read request, the Flash Memory Manager shall read the
data from the flash memory and perform the Circular Redundancy
Check (CRC).
Mem-005 If CRC fails, the Flash Memory Manager shall reread the data
from the flash memory.
Mem-006 For the same read request, the number of attempts by the Flash
Memory Manager to read data from the flash memory shall have
a value not larger than the parameter MAX FM READS.
Mem-007 If the number of attempts by the Flash Memory Manager to read
data from the flash memory exceeds MAX FM READS, the read
operation shall be abandoned and a failure shall be reported.
Table 1: Complete list of requirements
3.3 BIP model design by architecture application
We illustrate the architecture-based approach on the CDMS status, MESSAGE LIBRARY and HK PL
components. In particular, we present the application of Action flow, Mode management, Client-
Server and Failure monitoring architectures to discharge a subset of the CubETH functional re-
quirements presented in the previous section. We additionally present the result of the composition
of Client-Server and Mode management architectures.
3.3.1 Application of Action flow architecture
Requirement CDMS-007, presented in Tab. 1, describes the functionality of CDMS status. The
corresponding BIP model is shown in Fig. 15. Watchdog reset is an operand component, which
is responsible for resetting the internal and external watchdogs. CDMS status ACTION FLOW is the
coordinator of the architecture applied on Watchdog reset that imposes the following order of
3MAX is a parameter. Its value must be fixed through analysis or simulation.
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Figure 15: Application of Action flow architecture
(a) Architecture application (b) Hexagons of Fig. 16a
Figure 16: Application of Client-Server architecture
actions: 1) internal watchdog reset; 2) external watchdog reset; 3) send heartbeat and 4) receive
result.
3.3.2 Application of Client-Server architecture
Requirements HK-001 and HK-003, presented in Tab. 1, suggest the application of the Client-
Server architecture on the HK PL, HK CDMS, HK EPS and HK COM housekeeping compounds (Fig. 5).
The four housekeeping compounds are the clients of the architecture. In Fig. 16a, we show
how Client-Server is applied on the HK PL process component, which is a subcomponent of
HK PL. HK PL process uses the composeMessage and decodeMessage C/C++ functions of the
MESSAGE LIBRARY component to encode and decode information transmitted to and from the COM
subsystem. Thus, the MESSAGE LIBRARY is a server used by the HK PL process client. To enhance
readability of figures in Fig. 16a, we use hexagons to group interaction patterns of components.
The meaning of these hexagons is explained in Fig. 16b.
3.3.3 Application of Failure monitoring architecture
Requirement HK-005, presented in Tab. 1, suggests the application of the Failure monitoring
architecture as shown in Fig. 17. The BIP model comprises the HK PL process operand and the
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Figure 17: Application of Failure monitoring architecture
HK PL FAILURE MONITORING coordinator. The success port of HK PL FAILURE MONITORING is
connected with the mem res and I2C res TTC ports of HK PL process. The failure port of HK
PL FAILURE MONITORING is connected with the I2C fail PL port of HK PL process. The HK PL
process component executes 6 actions in the following order: 1) start procedure; 2) ask Payload
for engineering data; 3) receive result from Payload or (in case of fail) abort; 4) if line of sight
communication is possible send data to COM, if line of sight communication is not possible make a
write request to the memory; 5) depending on action 4 either receive COM result or memory result
and 6) finish procedure.
3.3.4 Application of Mode management architecture
Requirements HK-003 and HK-004, presented in Tab. 1, suggest the application of a Mode manage-
ment architecture with two modes: 1) TTC mode, in which line of sight communication is possible
and 2) MEMORY mode, in which line of sight communication is not possible. The corresponding
BIP model, shown in Fig. 18, comprises the HK PL process, s15 1 and s15 2 operands and the
Packet store MODE MANAGER coordinator. During NOMINAL operation, the Payload subsystem is
contacted to retrieve engineering data. Depending on the mode of Packet store MODE MANAGER,
those data is then sent to the non-volatile memory, i.e. mem write req transition, or directly to
the COM subsystem, i.e. ask I2C TTC transition. The mode of Packet store MODE MANAGER is
triggered by the s15 1, s15 2 services.
3.3.5 Composition of architectures
The architecture composition was formally defined in [2]. Here, we provide only an illustrative
example. Combined application of architectures to a common set of operand components results
in merging the connectors that involve ports used by several architectures. For instance, Fig. 19
shows the composition of Client-Server and Mode management architectures. The HK PL process
component is a sub-component of HK PL. The application of the Client-Server architecture (Fig. 16)
connects its port ask with the port composeMessage of MESSAGE LIBRARY through the MES LIB-
HK to I2C interface with a binary connector. Similarly, the application of the Mode management
architecture (Fig. 18) connects the same port with the port ask I2C TTC of Packet store MODE
MANAGER with another binary connector. The composition of the two architectures results in
the two connectors being merged into the ternary connector ask-ask I2C TTC-composeMessage
(Fig. 19).
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Figure 18: Application of Mode management architecture
3.4 Complete BIP model of the case study
In this section, we present the full componentization of the case study. The complete model
consists of 22 operand components and 27 coordinator components. We omit the presentation of
the CDMS status compound which was already presented in Sect. 3.3.1. We have shown in Fig. 5
the high level interaction model of the case study. As discussed earlier, we use hexagons to group
interaction patterns of components. The meaning of connections between the hexagons of Fig. 5
is explained in Fig. 20.
3.4.1 Libraries
The model includes three library components that contain helper C/C++ functions. Fig. 21 shows
the I2C sat LIBRARY, the MEMORY LIBRARY and the MESSAGE LIBRARY components. All of them
are operands. I2C sat LIBRARY contains functions that allow communication on the I2C sat bus.
I2C sat LIBRARY contains functions that allow writing, reading and checking the CRC in the
non-volatile flash memory. I2C sat LIBRARY allows a user to compose a message that is going to
be send over the I2C sat bus and also to decode a message received from the I2C sat bus.
3.4.2 Housekeeping report enable, housekeeping report disable
The model includes two service components, namely s3 5 and s3 6 that are in charge of the acti-
vation and deactivation of the housekeeping subsystems. Both of them are operand components.
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Figure 19: Composition of Client-Server and Mode management architectures
3.4.3 Packet storage enable and packet storage disable
The model includes two service components, namely s15 1 and s15 2 that modify the destination
of the housekeeping data which is either the non volatile memory or the COM subsystem. Both of
them are operand components.
3.4.4 Error logging
The Error logging compound, shown in Fig. 24, protects a specific RAM region that is accessible
by many users. Every time a hardware error is produced it is stored in an array managed by this
compound. No two users can log an error at the same time. It is composed of an operand
component Log and a Mutual exclusion coordinator Log MUTEX.
3.4.5 Payload
The Payload (PL) compound, shown in Fig. 25, is in charge of payload operations. It is com-
posed of the following subcomponents: 1) s128 1 which adds a scenario to the payload board;
2) s128 4 which executes a scenario telecommand; 3) 128 5 which aborts a payload opera-
tion; 4) data transfer which transfers data from the payload to the non volatile memory; 5)
status verification which checks the advancement of the payload board internal algorithms
and 6) and a PL mode management coordinator.
The s128 1. s128 4, s128 5 and the status verification components consist of a Mutual
exclusion coordinator and a 128 * process operand. The data transfer component consists of a
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Figure 20: Meaning of connections between hexagons of Fig. 5
(a) The I2C sat library compo-
nent
(b) The memory library compo-
nent
(c) The message library compo-
nent
Figure 21: Library components
(a) The s3 5 component (b) The s3 6 component
Figure 22: Housekeeping report enable and disable
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(a) The s15 1 component (b) The s15 2 component
Figure 23: Packet storage enable and disable
Figure 24: The error logging compound
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Mode manager coordinator and the data transfer process operand. The status verification
component consists of a Mutex coordinator and the status verification process operand.
Payload has four modes of operation (IDLE, SCENARIO READY, STARTED and RESULT READY),
which comprise the states of the PL mode management coordinator. In IDLE mode, the payload
does not operate. In SCENARIO READY mode, a scenario is loaded on the payload board. In
STARTED mode, the payload data acquisition begins. The status verification component polls
the payload board to check whether its memory is full. Once the memory is full, the mode
changes to SCENARIO READY. SCENARIO READY mode, the data is transferred to the non volatile
flash memory, through the data transfer component.
3.4.6 Housekeeping subsystems
There are three Housekeeping subsystems, namely HK PL, shown in Fig. 26, HK EPS, shown in
Fig. 27, and HK COM, shown in Fig. 28, that are in charged of recovering engineering from the PL,
EPS, COM subsystems of the satellite, respectively. The are composed of the same subcomponents:
1) a HK MUTEX coordinator; 2) an HK process operand; 3) an HK MODE MANAGER coordinator; 4)
an Packet store MODE MANAGER coordinator and 5) a HK FAILURE MONITORING coordinator.
The HK MUTEX component ensures mutual exclusion on the access of the subsystem. During
NOMINAL operation, a subsystem is contacted to retrieve engineering data. Those data is then sent
to the non volatile memory or directly to the COM subsystem, depending on the Packet store
MODE MANAGER coordinator. The HK MODE MANAGER inhibits the HK process.
3.4.7 Internal Housekeeping
The HK CDMS compound, shown in Fig. 29, is internal to the CDMS subsystem. It is very similar
to the rest of Housekeeping subsystems. The difference is that the Housekeeping data of the HK
CDMS is not retrieved through the I2C bus but through internal processes (e.g. GPIO and state
registers). The Failure monitoring coordinator is also removed because the EPS subsystem directly
monitors the HK CDMS through the heartbeats.
3.4.8 I2C sat
The I2C sat compound, shown in Fig. 30, implements the I2C sat bus protocol. The request
transition is enabled as soon as a user wants to send a message through the I2C bus. It consists of
the I2C sat read operand, the I2C sat MODE MANAGEMENT coordinator and the I2C sat write
operand. Mutual exclusion is ensured by the fact that this compound is the only one implementing
the use of the I2C peripheral. Thus, once a request is issued no other user can access the bus until
it has retuned to the IDLE state of I2C sat write.
The send transition of I2C sat write sends a message to the selected slave on the line. The
poll transition of I2C sat read fetches an answer from the slave.
3.4.9 Flash memory management
The reading and writing procedures to the external non volatile NOR flash memory are represented
by the compound shown in Fig. 31. The memory device can be read and written through the write
and read transitions. The Flash Memory MUTEX compound ensures that the memory is accessed
by the users atomically. It consists of two operands (Flash Memory Write and Flash Memory
Read), two Mode Manager coordinators and a Mutual exclusion coordinator.
After a write request, Flash Memory Write takes the buffer prepared by the user and starts
writing it in the memory. From WAIT to STATUS WRITE there is an internal transition which adds
a delay for a certain period of time. This is the minimum time to wait for the memory device
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Figure 26: The Housekeeping Payload compound
Figure 27: The Housekeeping EPS compound
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Figure 28: The Housekeeping COM compound
Figure 29: The Internal Housekeeping compound
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Figure 30: The I2C sat compound
to effectively write on the buffer. If the buffer is bigger than the write sector, then the this
procedure continues (synchronization of write with the continue of the Write MODE MANAGER).
If there is no more data to write and the procedure was successful, the ok write transition is
fired and the coordinator enters the DONE state. The internal finish transition leads back to the
WRITE BUFFER state. If the memory does not perform as expected, e.g. internal timeout, internal
error, the writing procedure is aborted with the fail transition.
After a read request, Flash Memory Read reads a part of the memory and puts data in the
buffer indicated by the user. After the region is read, a CRC check is performed. If the result is
declared as “bad”, the memory region is read again (synchronization of read with the continue
of the Read MODE MANAGER). After a maximum number of times is reached, the fail transition is
fired. If the CRC check is successful, the ok read transition is fired to the DONE state and the
internal finish transition leads back to the READ BUFFER state.
3.5 Full list of properties of the CubETH subsystems
We present the complete set of characteristic properties for the architectures applied in each
CubETH subsystem. For brevity, we use symbolic names as predicates in the formulas. These
symbolic names include a) a characteristic port that participates in the interaction and b) the
Payload subcomponent in which the port is localized, whenever it is necessary for disambiguation.
Note that we use components s128 4 takeTC1, s128 4 takeTC2, s128 1 takeTC1, s128 1 takeTC2,
s128 5 takeTC1, s128 5 takeTC2 which fulfill the assumption that they have a critical state
’TAKE’, in order to specify characteristic properties for the Mutual Exclusion management on the
resources s128 4, s128 1 and s128 5, respectively. The concrete components that attempt to access
these resources are external to the subsystems of the CubETH case study, thus we denote them in
the characteristic properties using the aforementioned abstract components. the same applies for
the components status verifier1, status verifier2, HKPL reader1, HKPL reader2, HKEPS reader1,
HKEPS reader2, HKCOM reader1, HKCOM reader2, HKCDMS reader1 and HKCDMS reader2.
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Figure 31: The flash memory compound
3.5.1 Properties of the Payload subsystem
Mutual Exclusion in s128 4
MX.1 AG ( ¬ (s128 4 takeTC1 inState(TAKE) ∧ s128 4 takeTC2 inState(TAKE) ) )
Mutual Exclusion in s128 1
MX.1 AG ( ¬ ( s128 1 takeTC1 inState(TAKE) ∧ s128 1 takeTC2 inState(TAKE) ) )
Mutual Exclusion in s128 5
MX.1 AG ( ¬ (s128 5 takeTC1 inState(TAKE) ∧ s128 5 takeTC2 inState(TAKE) ) )
Mode Management in data transfer
MD.1 AG( dat trans start → DTModeManager inState(BUSY) )
Mode Management in payload
MD.1i AG( s128 4 exec → (PLModeManager inState(SCENARIO READY))
MD.1ii AG( stat ver started → (PLModeManager inState(STARTED) )
MD.1iii AG( s128 4 load → PLModeManager inState(IDLE) )
MD.1iv AG(dat trans to busy → PLModeManager inState(RESULT READY) ))
Mutual Exclusion management in Status Verification
MX.1 AG ( ¬ ( status verifier1 inState(START) ∧ status verifier2 inState(START) ) )
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3.5.2 Properties of the I2C sat subsystem
Mode management in I2C sat
MD.1 AG( I2C sat process poll → I2CsatModeManagement inState(S1) )
3.5.3 Properties of the HK PL subsystem
Mode Management in HK PL Packet Store
MD.1i AG ( HKPL mem write req → HKPL PSModeMngment inState(MEMORY) )
MD.1ii AG ( HKPL ask I2C TTC → HKPL PSModeMngment inState(TTC) )
Mode Management in HK PL
MD.1 AG ( HKPL read HK → HKPL ModeMngment inState(ENABLED) )
Mutual Exclusion management in HK PL
MX.1 AG ( ¬ (HKPL HK reader1 inState(READ) ∧ HKPL HK reader2 inState(READ))
)
Failure Monitoring in HK PL
FM.1 AG ( HKPL I2C fail error → AX A[ ¬ HKPL finish W ( ( HKPL I2C res TTC ∨
HKPL mem res) HKPL I2C res EPS) ]
3.5.4 Properties of the HK EPS subsystem
Mode Management in HK EPS Packet Store
MD.1i AG ( HKEPS mem write req → HKEPS PSModeMngment inState(MEMORY) )
MD.1ii AG ( HKEPS ask I2C TTC → HKEPS PSModeMngment inState(TTC) )
Mode Management in HK EPS
MD.1 AG ( HKEPS read HK → HKEPS ModeMngment inState(ENABLED) )
Mutual Exclusion management in HK EPS
MX.1 AG ( ¬ (HKEPS reader1 inState(READ) ∧ HKEPS reader2 inState(READ)) )
Failure Monitoring in HK EPS
FM.1 AG ( HKEPS I2C fail error → AX A[ ¬ HKEPS finish W ( ( HKEPS I2C res TTC
∨ HKEPS mem res) HKEPS I2C res EPS) ]
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3.5.5 Properties of the HK COM subsystem
Mode Management in HK COM Packet Store
MD.1i AG ( HKCOM mem write req → HKCOM PSModeMngment inState(MEMORY)
)
MD.1ii AG ( HKCOM ask I2C TTC → HKCOM PSModeMngment inState(TTC) )
Mode Management in HK COM
MD.1 AG ( HKCOM read HK → HKCOM ModeMngment inState(ENABLED) )
Mutual Exclusion management in HK COM
MX.1 AG ( ¬ (HKCOM reader1 inState(READ) ∧ HKCOM reader2 inState(READ)) )
Failure Monitoring in HK COM
FM.1 AG ( HKCOM I2C fail error→AX A[ ¬HKCOM finish W ( ( HKCOM I2C res TTC
∨ HKCOM mem res) HKCOM I2C res EPS) ]
3.5.6 Properties of the HK CDMS subsystem
Mode Management in HK CDMS Packet Store
MD.1i AG ( HKCDMS mem write req→HKCDMS PSModeMngment inState(MEMORY)
)
MD.1ii AG ( HKCDMS ask sat → HKCDMS PSModeMngment inState(SAT) )
Mode Management in HK CDMS
MD.1 AG ( HKCDMS read HK → HKCDMS ModeMngment inState(ENABLED) )
Mutual Exclusion management in HK CDMS
MX.1 AG ( ¬ (HKCDMS reader1 inState(READ) ∧ HKCDMS reader2 inState(READ)) )
3.5.7 Properties of the Flash Memory subsystem
Mode Management in Flash Memory Read
MD.1 AG ( FlashMem read → MEMRD ModeMngment inState(READ) )
Mode Management in Flash Memory Write
MD.1 AG ( FlashMem write → MEMWR ModeMngment inState(WRITE) )
Mutual Exclusion management in Flash Memory
MX.1 AG ( ¬ ( data transfer proc inState(MEM) ∧HKPL proc inState(WAIT) ∧HKEPS proc inState(WAIT)
∧ HKCOM proc inState(WAIT) ∧ HKCDMS proc inState(WAIT)) )
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3.5.8 Properties of the CDMS status subsystem
Action Flow in CDMS status
AF.1 AG ( CDMS ActFlow start → AX A [ ¬ CDMS I2C ask W reset done ] )
AF.2i AG ( internal watchdog → AX A [ ¬ internal watchdog W CDMS ActFlow start ])
AF.2ii AG ( CDMS I2C ask → AX A [ ¬ CDMS I2C ask W CDMS ActFlow start ])
AF.3 AG ( CDMS ActFlow start → AX A [ ¬ CDMS ActFlow finish W CDMS I2C res ])
3.5.9 Properties of the Error Logging subsystem
Mutual Exclusion management in Error Logging
MX.1 AG ( ¬ ( I2C SAT proc error1 ∨ I2C SAT proc error2 ∨ I2C SAT proc error3 )
∧ (dataTransfer proc mem res )
∧ (HKCDMS proc mem res)
∧ (HKPL proc mem res ∨ HKPL proc I2C fail PL )
∧ (HKEPS proc mem res ∨ HKEPS proc I2C fail EPS )
∧ (HKCOM proc mem res ∨ HKCOM proc I2C fail COM )
∧ ( MEMRD proc fail ∨ MEMRD proc ok read ∨ MEMRD proc bad CRC )
) )
3.6 Model verification
Recall (Sect. 2) that safety properties imposed by architectures are preserved by architecture
composition [2]. Thus, all properties that we have associated to the CubETH requirements are
satisfied by construction by the complete model of the case study example.
Architectures enforce properties by restricting the joint behaviour of the operand components.
Therefore, combined application of architectures can generate deadlocks. We have used the
D-Finder tool [7] to verify deadlock-freedom of the case study model. D-Finder applies com-
positional verification on BIP models by over-approximating the set of reachable states, which
allows it to analyse very large models. The tool is sound, but incomplete: due to the above men-
tioned over-approximation it can produce false positives, i.e. potential deadlock states that are
unreachable in the concrete system. However, our case study model was shown to be deadlock-free
without any potential deadlocks. Thus, no additional reachability analysis was needed.
3.7 Validation of the approach
The key advantage of our architecture-based approach is that the burden of verification is shifted
from the final design to architectures, which are considerably smaller in size and can be reused.
In particular, all the architecture styles that we have identified for the case study are simple.
Their correctness—enforcing the characteristic properties—can be easily proved by inspection of
the coordinator behaviour. However, in order to increase the confidence in our approach, we have
conducted additional verification, using nuXmv to verify that the characteristic properties of the
architectures are, indeed, satisfied. We used the BIP-to-NuSMV tool4 to translate our BIP models
into NuSMV—the nuXmv input language [10].
Verification of the complete model with nuXmv did not succeed, running out of memory after
four days of execution. Thus, we repeated the procedure (BIP-to-NuSMV translation and verifica-
tion using nuXmv) on individual sub-systems. All connectors that crossed sub-system boundaries
4http://risd.epfl.ch/bip2nusmv
31
Table 2: Statistics of models and verification
Model Tool Components Connectors RSS Deadlocks Properties
CubETH D-Finder 49 155 - 0 -
Payload nuXmv 13 42 8851 0 9
I2C sat nuXmv 4 12 52 0 1
HK PL nuXmv 11 12 77274 0 5
HK EPS nuXmv 11 12 77274 0 5
HK COM nuXmv 11 12 77274 0 5
HK CDMS nuXmv 10 9 12798 0 5
Flash Memory nuXmv 6 15 44 0 3
CDMS status nuXmv 3 6 8 0 4
Error Logging nuXmv 2 2 2 0 1
RSS = Reachable State Space
were replaced by their corresponding sub-connectors. This introduces additional interactions,
hence, also additional execution branches. Since no priorities are used in the model, this modifi-
cation does not suppress any existing behaviour. Notice that the CTL properties enforced by the
presented architecture styles use only universal quantification (A) over execution branches. Hence,
the above approach is a sound abstraction, i.e. the fact that the properties were shown to hold in
the sub-systems immediately entails that they also hold in the complete model. The complete list
of CTL formulas is presented in [24]. Table 2 presents the complexity measures of the verification,
which was carried out on an Intel Core i7 at 3.50GHz with 16GB of RAM. Notice that component
count in sub-systems adds up to more than 49, because some components contribute to several
sub-systems.
4 Related work
The European Space Agency (ESA) advocates a model-based design flow rather than a document-
centric approach. To this end, a series of funded research initiatives has delivered interesting
results that are worth mentioning. The Space Avionics Open Interface Architecture (SAVOIR)5
project introduces the On-board Software Reference Architecture (OSRA) [21] that imposes cer-
tain structural constraints through the definition of the admissible types of software components
and patterns of interaction among their instances. The ASSERT Set of Tools for Engineering
(TASTE)6 [30] is more appropriate for the detailed software design and model-based code gener-
ation. In TASTE, the architectural design is captured through a graphical editor that generates a
model in the Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL). However, the AADL semantics
is not formally defined, which inhibits it from being used for rigorous design or formal verifica-
tion purposes. The Correctness, Modeling and Performance of Aerospace Systems (COMPASS)7
toolset relies on an AADL variant with formally defined semantics called SLIM and provides means
for a posteriori formal verification [13]. A formal semantics for the AADL has been defined in
BIP, along with a translation of AADL models into the BIP language [17]. The rigorous design
approach based on correct-by-construction steps is applied in the Functional Requirements and
Verification Techniques for the Software Reference Architecture (FoReVer)8 and the Catalogue of
System and Software Properties (CSSP) projects. The former initiative advocates a top-down de-
sign flow by imposing behavioural contracts on individual components [8], while the latter adopts
5http://savoir.estec.esa.int/
6http://taste.tuxfamily.org/.
7http://compass.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/.
8https://es-static.fbk.eu/projects/forever/
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our architecture-based design flow relying on BIP.
Although a number of frameworks exist for the specification of architectures [26, 28, 36], model
design and code generation [1, 6, 12, 34, 35], and verification [11, 16, 18, 22], we are not aware of
any that combine all these features. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, our approach is
the first application of requirement-driven correct-by-construction design in the domain of satellite
on-board software, which relies on requirements to define a high-level model that can be directly
used to generate executable code for the satellite control [29].
BIP has previously been used for the design of control software. The applications closest to
ours are the initial design of the CubETH [29] and the DALA robot [5] control software. While
the latter design followed a predefined software architecture (in the sense of [4]), the former was
purely ad-hoc. Neither was driven by a detailed set of requirements.
In [19], the authors describe the interfacing of Temporal Logic Planning toolbox (TuLiP) with
the JPL Statechart Autocoder (SCA) for the automatic generation of control software. The TuLiP
toolbox generates from statechart models from high-level specifications expressed as formulas of
particular form in the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). SCA is then used to generate Python, C
or C++ code from the obtained statecharts. This approach is grounded in formal semantics, it
provides correctness guarantees through the automatic synthesis of control behaviour. Further-
more, the transition through statecharts allows the use of graphical tools to visualise the controller
behaviour. However, it also has some limitations. Most notably, it focuses exclusively on the syn-
thesis of one controller component and is not easily amenable to the holistic design of complete
software systems involving concurrent components.
5 Conclusion and future work
Based on previous work [29], we have analysed the command and data management sub-system
(CDMS) of the CubETH nanosatellite on-board software (OBSW), concentrating primarily on
safety and modularity of the software. Starting from a set of informal requirements, we have used
the architecture-based approach [2] to design a BIP model of the CDMS sub-system. We have
illustrated the key steps of the BIP model design, discussed and evaluated the verification and
validation procedures.
The architecture-based approach consists in the application of a number of architectures start-
ing with a minimal set of atomic components. Each architecture enforces by construction a charac-
teristic safety property on the joint behaviour of the operand components. The combined applica-
tion of architectures is defined by an associative and commutative operator [2], which guarantees
the preservation of the enforced properties. Since, architectures enforce properties by restricting
the joint behaviour of the operand components, combined application of architectures can lead to
deadlocks. Thus, the final step of the design process consists in verifying the deadlock-freedom
of the obtained model. The key advantage of this approach is that the burden of verification
is shifted from the final design to architectures, which are considerably smaller in size and can
be reused. This advantage is illustrated by our verification results: while model-checking of the
complete model was inconclusive, verification of deadlock-freedom took only a very short time,
using the D-Finder tool.
The main contribution of the presented work is the identification and formal modelling—
using architecture diagrams [25]—of 9 architecture styles. Architecture styles represent recurring
coordination patterns: those identified in the case study have been reused in the framework of a
collaborative project funded by ESA and can be further reused in other satellite OBSW.
The case study serves as a feasibility proof for the use of architecture-based approach in OBSW
design for nano- and picosatellites, as well as scientific instruments. The modular nature of BIP
allows iterative design for satellites in development and component reuse for subsequent missions.
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The automatic generation of C++ code provided by the BIP tool-set enables early prototyping
and validation of software functionality even before the hardware platform is completely defined,
also contributing to portability of designs. Indeed, the only non-trivial action required in order to
use a different target platform is to recompile the BIP engine.
This case study opens a number of directions for future work. In the framework of the ESA
project, we are currently developing a tool for the automatic application and composition of
architectures and a GUI tool for ontology-based specification of user requirements. We plan to
integrate these, together with the BIP framework, into a dedicated tool-chain for OBSW design,
providing requirement traceability and early validation. We also plan to expand our taxonomy of
architecture styles and study the application of parametrised model checking techniques for their
formal verification. Finally, it would be interesting to extend the architecture-based approach to
real-time systems. Composability of real-time architectures will require a notion of non-interference
similar to that used to ensure the preservation of liveness properties in [2].
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